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Introduction 
The First World War, the "Urkatastrophe" (George F. Kennan) of the 
twentieth century, continues to attract the attention of the international 
community of historians - and for good reasons.' Despite the fact that 
books on the war fill entire libraries, studies on various aspects of the war 
are being published each year.2 The foci of these studies are too diverse to 
detect specific paradigms that dominate the scholarly discourse. However, 
two fields of enquiry in particular catch the imagination of historians: 
1) aspects that are, broadly speaking, located within the field of the ne': 
"cultural history" -the experience of daily life during the war; the way m 
which the war re-shaped the mentalities of Europeans; the commemora-
tion of the war.' 
2) The origins of the war. This debate centers on the interests of the Great 
Powers, crisis management, defense policies and preparedness.• 
In contrast, the neutral countries have received only scant attention by 
historians. Where language barriers did not inhibit the transfer of knowl-
edge (as in the case of the Netherlands, where the two historians on the 
war published their works in Dutch),' the few English-language publica-
tions by Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish historians or the Swiss experts 
who have written in German have mostly entered the scholarly debate by 
way of footnotes.• Given the relative importance of ~e European neutral~ 
during World War One, this near absence of informatiOn and knowledge IS 
deplorable. But apart from the language factor, two aspects may ha_ve 
contributed to the relative neglect of research on the neutral countnes. 
One is the simple fact that foreign policy in neutral countries was relevant 
only in moments of national crises. In other words, the study of the 
interaction between a neutral state and the outside world has largely been 
confined to moments in history when national survival was at stake - and 
that did not seem to be the case during World War One.' The second 
4 
DEFENCE STUDIES :1J2000 
problem is related to the traumatic experience of World War Two. A case 
in point is the Netherhinds. Low interest in the Dutch history of the First 
World War had much to do with the understandable focus of historians on 
the period of the Second World War. Occupation histories and the prob-
lems of cooperation versus resistance have dominated public and scholarly 
discourses until today. 
This article focuses on the role and position of the neutral countries 
within the international system during the era of the First World War. 
Given my background as ~ historian interested in the interaction of the 
Netherlands with the belligerents, there will be an unavoidable emphasis on 
the Dutch experience. 8 Wherever possible, however, I have incorporated 
Scandinavian perspectives and experiences in order to point out similarities 
and differences. The following comments center on four main theses: 
I) Multilateralism- cooperation among neutral countries- was an impor-
tant topic of debate. Neutral cooperation would have introduced new 
political dimensions to the meaning of neutrality. In the end, however, 
neutrality entailed non-involvement, responsiveness and passivity rather 
than action. It is no coincidence that most of the neutral nations after 
World War Two preferred the term non-aligned nations.• 
2) The neutrals were of significant importance to the German war 
economy; despite the blockade and despite the fact that economically they 
had- to varying degrees -to correspond with the British economic 
warfare (see tables I and 2).10 
3) Neutral foreign policy meant first and foremost foreign economic 
policy. With the possible exception of Sweden, governments retreated as 
far as possible from the foreign policy decision-making. This was not an 
act of abdication, but a prudent realization of the limits of neutrality. 
Instead, neutral countries resorted to corporatist models. Government-
business relations became highly important and secured the independence 
of the neutrals. 11 
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4) There are still many blank spots in the history of the neutrals during 
World War One. Comparative approaches could shed more light on the 
behavior of neutral states during times of crisis, and the domestic implica-
tions of the war are still under-researched." 
"Virtual History" and Multilateralism 
Put briefly, virtual history looks at alternative paths of historical develop-
ment. While it analyses the same sources as the ones utilized for "recon-
structing" the past, virtual history feels free to imagine possibilities-
possibilities in the sense the Austrian writer Robert Musil in his novel "The 
Man without Qualities" - Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften - defmed the 
term: Possibilities as realities not yet lived.13 
At the invitation ofKnut Wallenberg, Sweden's wartime foreign minis-
ter up to early 1917, the three Scandinavian foreign ministers met at 
Malmll in December of 1914 to exchange information on how to respond 
to the war. The meeting was intended as a symbol of Scandinavian unity, 
and it aroused the interest of the diplomats and the press in the belligerent 
and neutral countries." Swiss and Dutch newspapers argued that the time 
had come for some common action of the neutral countries. The war on 
the western front had turned into a bloody and indefinite stalemate, and the 
British blockade came to be felt in neutral countries. Consumers were 
faced with rising prices and inflation, and neutral governments slowly 
realized the complex problems of a globalized economy and of the distri-
bution of food, energy, and raw materials. A harmonization of 
Scandinavian responses to these intricate problems, as desired by the 
Swedish government, was one thing. But neutral cooperation on a more 
international basis was another thing. There was no doubt that the Dutch 
as well felt that the British blockade infringed upon neutral rights and that 
the scale and intensity of economic warfare seriously inhibited the rights 
of neutrals to trade with both groups of belligerents. But the Dutch, 
Norwegians and Danes, who perceived Swedish politics to be pro-German 
and Swedish overtures for a combination of neutrals to be one-sided and 
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potentially anti-British, under no circumstances wanted to complicate their 
already strained relations with London. 15 
The situation changed completely with the German declaration of 
unrestricted U-boat warfare in the waters around the British isles in 
February 1915. Now, there seemed ground for a balanced response to the 
actions of both groups ofbelligerents. Again, the Swedish foreign ministry 
became active, and at The Hague the government and the press were 
equally in favor of a common protest. Land-locked Switzerland seemed 
interested, too. But to everyone in the foreign ministries of neutral Euro-
pean countries it was clear that common action could only be effective if 
the self-declared guardian of neutral rights, the United States, became a 
party to the club. Apart from capabilities and potentials, there was a simple 
reason why the US was important: the US produced the products the 
European neutrals desired to obtain. Independently, both the Swedish and 
Dutch ministers at Washington called repeatedly at the Department of 
State in order to sound out the American view about a possible coopera-
tion of neutrals. 16 
To Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, and Councelor Robert 
Lansing the question was not new. Several Latin American countries had 
already voiced their concern about the British blockade, and the Argentin-
ian minister in particular had promoted some kind of common neutral 
protest. 17 The topic had also been discussed in American newspapers, and 
American ministers abroad, like Henry van Dyke in the Netherlands, had 
urged their government to come out in favor of common action. In 
addition, non-governmental actors- scholars of intemationallaw, social-
ists, women, and journalists - from various neutral countries practised 
cooperation by convening conferences and by discussing ways and means 
to bring about an end to the war. 18 Thus, a multitude of proposals were on 
the table. They ranged from common protests against the actions of both 
groups of belligerents or the convening of a conference of neutrals, where 
the freedom of the high seas and other problems of international law could 
be discussed, to outright calls for an end of the war. As Lansing argued: 
"The best way to fight combination is by combination".19 
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Combination did not materialize. Norway and Denmark were apprehen-
sive of Swedish designs, and Switzerland, the Netherlands and the Latin 
American countries wanted to participate only if the United States would 
join. But the US, and more specifically, President Woodrow Wilson and 
Bryan vetoed all projects of neutral cooperation. For the two, it did not 
make sense to participate in a forum where vulnerable and small European 
countries were represented. Wilson and Bryan clearly perceived the danger 
inherent in a common protest or even a conference of neutrals. As Bryan 
explained, such an undertaking "would be considered not upon its merit, 
but as it affected one side or the other". 20 
Despite the American determination to stay clear of"entangling alli-
ances", the topic remained high on the agenda of neutral governments. 
There was some cooperation between the Scandinavian countries, but this 
was largely symbolic and did not involve vital questions of regional 
economy or responses to the policies of the belligerents. Unilaterally, both 
the Swedish and the Dutch governments unsuccessfully tried to enlist 
American participation in specific cases, i.e. complaints against the seizure 
and censorship of mail by the British. And the longer the war lasted, the 
more neutral press commentators spoke out in favor of common action. 21 
In the summer of 1916, the Entente provided the neutra!s with another 
opportunity to bring about some kind of cooperation. In June of 1916, on 
the occasion of the inter-allied economic conference at Paris, the Entente 
tentatively agreed to pool their interests in preferential access to raw 
materials in the post-war period. Neutral protest against this intention was 
tremendous, and in the United States apprehensions turned into violent 
protest when the British Government published a lengthy blacklist of 
American companies which supposedly or actually had cooperated with 
German-owned firms. Companies on this blacklist would henceforth be 
excluded from trading with Allied companies. 22 Again, Lansing, now 
Secretary of State, recommended an inter-neutral cooperation, and the 
Department of Commerce concurred. The Swedish government sounded 
out topics of discussion among neutral governments, and at Bern and The 
Hague the topic received considerable attention. Matters came to a head 
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when Stockholm in November of 1916 officially invited the United States 
to participate in a conference ofneutrals. But as in 1915, Wilson declined, 
and that in turn triggered negative responses by the Swiss, Dutch, and 
Spanish governments. It was the last time during the war that an inter-
neutral cooperation was seriously discussed among governments." 
A multilateral response to the war by neutral governments was ruled 
out on many grounds: a number of neutral governments felt that a confer-
ence initiated by Sweden would only favor Germany; all of the neutral 
countries felt that it was imperative to enlist the support and participation 
of the United States; the US, as mentioned, did not have an interest to 
become "entangled" in a cooperation with unequal partners, and they also 
feared that a conference of neutrals would work to the advantage of one 
belligerent, namely Germany. Thus, neutrality precluded multilateral action. 
One can only speculate what an inter-neutral cooperation might have 
effected. Let's have a look at the motivating factors: neutral countries 
were highly affected by the British blockade and by the increasingly tight 
global network of economic and financial warfare. They were even more 
threatened by the German U-boat campaign. The life of neutral citizens 
crossing the Atlantic was in danger, and indeed, quite a number of passen-
gers lost their life, the Lusitania being the most prominent example. 
Moreover, thousands of neutral seamen, especially Norwegians, were 
killed by German submarines.24 On a political level, neutral cooperation 
would have served as a deterrent, thus significantly enhancing the power 
of the individual neutral country. 
Let's come to the "virtual" part of the story: What would have been the 
result and impact of neutral cooperation? At the lowest level, both groups 
ofbelligerents would have been subject to severe collective criticism, 
possibly with little or no effect. On a more concrete level, it could have led 
to forms of economic cooperation, thus countering the pressure of the 
British blockade. Germany might have received more goods, particularly 
foodstuffs and raw materials from neutral countries. Thus, it would have 
crippled Britain's chief instrument of war, the blockade, and it would have 
worked in favor of the German war effort. On a grand scale, neutral 
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cooperation might have changed the course of history. 
One can further conclude that the war radicalized ideas and expecta-
tions about the future. Such a scenario - neutral cooperation -was 
exactly what influential members of the ruling elites of the German Empire 
had in mind. It is no coincidence that at the time the Swedish government 
invited the US to participate in a conference of neutrals, the German 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Gottlieb v. Jagow, was contemplat-
ing the virtues of neutral cooperation and was trying to effect such a 
cooperation. That it did not come about was, at various times during the 
war, strongly regretted." Germany tried to·rely, and in some cases, did 
rely substantially on the neutrals, particularly on the so-called Northern 
neutrals. This had basically to do with the geographical position, well-
established economic relations, and strategic imperatives. These factors 
were also instrumental in pre-war German war planning. By way of 
comparison with British thinking, I'd like to turn to that aspect now. 
Pre-War Strategic Planning 
One of the striking features of German strategic planning with regards to 
the neutrals in the pre-war period is its defensive character. While political 
thinking tended to develop along expansionist lines, strategic planning was 
relatively unrelated to what influential politicians, diplomats and business-
men had in mind." This compartrnentalization or fragmentation of political 
and strategic thinking reflected a basic characteristic of institutionalized 
decision-making in Imperial Germany and the lack of a coherent grand 
strategy. Around the turn of the century, the Imperial Navy developed 
plans for the occupation of the Netherlands and Denmark in the event of a 
war with Great Britain, both for the purpose of gaining naval bases and for 
preventing the British from creating strongpoints for a possible invasion of 
German territory. But these plans conflicted with then current or future 
plans of the army. The result was that by 1914 the navy had abandoned 
the Baltic sea as a !heater of operations. 27 That in turn meant that Germany 
would respect the neutrality of the Scandinavian countries. With regard to 
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the Netherlands, the Prussian General Staff under the command of 
Helmuth v. Moltke switched from an offensive to a defensive strategy. In 
1907, Moltke decided that the neutrality of the Netherlands should under 
no circumstances be violated. While his predecessor Schlieffen had 
believed that the German armies in their drive towards France had to rely 
on the Dutch railroad network - Schlieffen assumed that the Dutch would 
not resist-, Moltke argued that in order to wage the envisaged "peoples' 
war" (Volkskrieg) of longer duration, Germany needed a neutral outlet to 
the sea. Thus, Moltke wrote: "For us, it will be of the utmost importance 
to have in Holland a country, whose neutrality will assure imports and 
exports. It will have to be our windpipe that enables us to breathe"." 
The windpipe-scheme as well as the abandonment of the Baltic as a 
!heater of operations implied that Germany informed neigh boring countries 
that she would respect their neutrality and vice versa. Thus, on various 
occasions German diplomats sounded out Danish and Dutch representa-
tives about their country's intentions in the event of a war, and Moltke 
himself promised to respect the Danish and Dutch neutrality. Contrary 
with today, pledges of honor may have been more important in an age 
where a small elite of predominently aristocratic background conducted 
the so-called high affairs of state. But both countries initiated defense bills 
aimed at strengthening coastal defenses in order to gain the trust of 
Germany. Representatives of the German army even seem to have advised 
Dutch counterparts on questions of strengthening coastal defenses. 
Discussions with Swedish representatives about a military convention 
were not successful. But here, too, it was clear to the German military 
that Sweden would not enter a war on the side of Germany's adversaries. 
Thus, by 1914 a kind of informal network based on assurances, pledges, 
and demonstrations of military preparedness between Germany and its 
four neutral neighbors had been established.29 In August 1914, this belt of 
northwestern and northern neutral countries facilitated the German design 
to fully concentrate on the West and East respectively, thus, to execute the 
revised Schlieffen plan. Neutrality served German interests. But the 
deliberations of the pre-war period also made clear that neutrality did not 
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rest solely on the intention of a sovereign country to stand aside in a future 
conflict. Neutrality had to be respected and assured - in advance, so to 
speak - by the Great Powers. 
The respect for neutrality constituted a major problem for British 
strategic planning after 1904, that is, after the formation of the Entente 
Cordiale and following the realization that Great Britain could not and 
would not remain neutral in the event of a Franco-German war. As in 
Germany, strategic planning by the navy and army did not always coincide 
and complement each other. But thanks to the Committee of Imperial 
Defense, institutional fragmentation could be overcome much more easily 
than in Germany. By 1912, the basic outlines of British strategic planning 
for a war with Germany were clear. They rested on the following assump-
tions: In order to ensure exports and imports for the needs of a highly 
industrialized country, Britain had favored neutrality laws that would allow 
her to utilize the freedom of the high seas as well as the neutral countries 
and their merchant marines as bases of supply in the event of war. Thus, 
the Foreign Office had consented to the Declaration of London of 1909, 
which had specified blockade regulations and had enlarged the freedom of 
neutral trade in wartime. Here, the defensive factor played a leading role 
for the policymakers. However, an influential circle around First Sea Lord 
John Fisher, CID-Secretary Maurice Hankey and other navalists realized 
that Britain would have to break international law in order to effectively 
apply her naval superiority in the North Sea. By 1912, the CID had come 
to the conclusion that Germany would try to use the adjacent countries as 
vital trade mediators with the outside world. Thus, a close blockade of the 
German coast sanctioned by international law would be ineffective. The 
solution was found in the adoption of a "distant blockade"- an observa-
tional line between Norway and Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and southwards 
towards the Dutch (and Belgian) coast. Neutrality would be respected, but 
only on Britain's terms." British strategic planning for a war with Ger-
many, the adoption of the distant blockade, thus rested on two assump-
tions: 
I) that the United States as the major non-European trade partner of 
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Germany and the neutrals would not go to war with Great Britain over 
blockade matters (as it did in the War of 1812) 
2) that the neutrals, and in particular Belgium and the Netherlands, would 
either cooperate in matters of economic warfare or would fight with the 
Germans. 
War Aims and Expectations of the Future 
A persistent theme of the pre-war period was the German desire to create 
a truly Germanic federalist empire. It was not a deliberate plan, in which 
specific actions were executed in order to achieve the objective. It was, as 
mentioned, a desire - a desire based on the notion of a perceived common 
ethnicity and culture (the teutonic countries; the Germanic states, etc.). 
Conservative commentators wanted to a large extent to incorporate the 
"lost tribesmen" of "lower Germany" in the west, and the Bavarian crown 
prince dreamed of a federalist empire in which Bavaria and Holland would 
constitute a real counterweight to Prussian dominance. Likewise, an 
infusion of Viking blood or the incorporation of sturdy Northern farmers 
with their perceived attachment to home and soil could counter the 
liberalizing tendencies of a modern industrialized society. Less insecure 
thinkers, coming from a more liberal background, argued that in a glo-
balizing economy smaller units were just too small to survive and larger 
units depended upon expansion." While the British had their Empire, the 
Americans their frontier and the Great West, and the Russians Siberia, the 
Great East, Germany's basis for competing effectively in an anarchic 
international system seemed rather limited. The war seemed to provide the 
means to create a more unified Central Europe in which the economies of 
the surrounding countries could be utilized in Germany's favor. 
An expression of the diversdnterests and sometimes conflicting 
objectives was the notorious "September program" by Chancellor 
Theobald v. Bethmann Hollweg. This tentative list of war aims with regard 
to the West called for, among other things, the formal integration of 
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Luxemburg and the informal integration of Belgium in the German empire. 
France, Austria-Hungary, Denmark, the Netherlands, and perhaps Sweden 
and Norway would have to form a central European economic union 
under German leadership, and the Netherlands in particular were singled 
out as junior partners of the Reich- nominally independent, but in fact 
dominated by Germany.32 Until mid-1916, the Auswartiges Amt, various 
influential newspapers, industrialists, people from the military like 
Ludendorff or Tirpitz, and influential members of the Reichstag favored a 
close alliance of Germany and the Netherlands in the future. This alliance 
could either take the form of a customs union or a military convention. 
The precondition for these plans was, however, that Germany would win 
the war.33 
During 1916 the expansionist designs gave way to more sober and 
realistic expectations. By that time it had already become clear that a 
European customs union would not necessarily be in favor of the German 
economy. Moreover, the longer the war lasted and the more it became 
apparent that regardless of a victory Germany would be politically and 
economically isolated in the post-war period, the independence and neu-
trality of the Netherlands again came to be regarded as a major asset. As 
the German minister in the Netherlands and future State Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, Richard v. KUhlmann, wrote, "At the end of this terrible 
conflict, Germany will be relatively isolated. It will be very convenient for 
us to have a neutral mediator right at our doors"." 
In the second half of the war, German designs vis-a-vis the Northern 
neutrals assumed a defensive posture. In view of the high dependence of 
the German economy on the world market, the neutrals came to be 
regarded as important instruments in the up-hill struggle for economic re-
integration after the war. This view was translated into specific objectives. 
Thus, for example, despite shortages everywhere, the Netherlands re-
ceived considerable quantities of steel suitable for ship-building during the 
war. Scandinavian shipyards were supplied with lesser quantities, but the 
objective remained the same: in the post-war period, neutral shipping lines 
would carry a fair share of the German overseas export." 
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Great Britain entered the war with the declared intention of safeguard-
ing and restoring the integrity and sovereignty of smaller nations. Expan-
sionist war aims with regard to the northern neutrals were therefore out of 
the question. However, expectations about the future and debates about 
war aims underwent significant changes during the war. In the pre-war 
period, the Netherlands had been regarded as an integral part ofthe 
German economy, and the perceived German "peaceful penetration" of all 
the four northern neutrals had been a topic of lively debate within govern-
ment, business and media circles." The blockade with its means of 
collecting information and of re-directing trade and finance offered a 
potentially powerful instrument to reverse this trend. Particularly towards 
the end of the war and in the immediate post-war period, British diplomats 
in the Netherlands and in Sweden as well as various business organizations 
like the Federation of British Industries urged their government to use the 
blockade for a sustained commercial offensive. However, there was only 
one instance of which I am aware of in which Britain actually used her 
economic power to enforce her interests, namely the supply of coal to the 
Scandinavian countries. As Olof Ahlander has shown, London used its 
dominating position on the coal market in Scandinavia to extract high 
prices and to get favorable tonnage agreements." However, since Britain 
had been the main supplier of coal all along and since the coal treaties with 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden were concluded after the blockade had 
been dismantled (namely between 1919 and 1921), it is difficult to regard 
them as an application of the power of the blockade. In general, practical 
problems (the inability to export products in large enough quantities and in 
ways in which neutral markets demanded the goods}, political considera-
tions (US participation in the blockade and the American interest in dis-
mantling it as soon as possible after the war) as well as ideological reasons 
(belief in free trade and open markets) stood in the way of using the 
blockade as an instrument suited for a fundamental re-direction of trade." 
Thus, by the early 1920s, the trade patterns and economic dependencies 
of the pre-war period had largely been restored. Germany again assumed 
the role of the main supplier of products for the northern neutral markets, 
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and Great Britain again became the most important market for goods 
produced in the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden." 
Politics and Economic Warfare 
From the perspective of the neutrals, a cooperation would have strength-
ened their role and position vis-a-vis the belligerents. Since this coopera-
tion did not come about, the northern neutrals tried to steer through the 
war on an individual basis as best they could. The really important deci-
sions neutral governments had to make revolved around the question of 
blockade and economic warfare, and I'd like to raise this point seperately 
from the political aspects. 
For all the parties involved, one question dominated politics to the 
almost total exclusion of other matters: neutrality. Throughout the war 
years, both Great Britain and Germany regarded the neutrality of the 
northern neutrals to be in their interest. And apart from Sweden, where the 
activists and a minority of the elite at one time or another played with the 
idea of entering the war on the side of Germany, neutrality was never 
seriously questioned by the peoples and governments of the Netherlands 
and the Scandinavian countries. 40 Each of the countries faced serious 
foreign policy crises and rumors of war, each country made military plans 
for a possible involvement, and each country conducted preparations to 
meet emergency cases. 
But neutrality meant different things to different governments and 
countries. As Olav Riste has shown, the Norwegian government pursued a 
policy favorable to the allies.41 This pro-allied policy was conditioned on 
the economic needs of the country and its concentration on a few domi-
nating sectors. Norway's pro-Allied policy was facilited by the simple fact 
that Germany was relatively far away and that Germany did not have the 
means to exert much influence, neither in the form of cooperation nor of 
pressure. And where German action did affect Norway, as in the case of 
the U-boat warfare, it antagonized public opinion and helped the British to 
tighten the blockade around Norway more and more. In addition, despite 
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heavy criticism of the government's conduct of foreign policy, there was 
a high degree of consensus with regard to the ultimate objectives. Patrick 
Salmon has recently written that Norway was perhaps the weakest of the 
neutrals, because of the imbalance offorces.42 I would question this 
argument and would propose that as a "neutral ally'' it could in general 
count on a rather understanding policy on the part of the Allies and par-
ticularly the United States.4' 
Instead, I would suggest that from an economic, geographical, and 
strategical point of view, Denmark was the most vulnerable and weakest 
of the three Scandinavian countries. Germany expected a friendly neutral-
ity, for example with regard to Danish exports or the closing of the 
entrances to the Baltic, and it did receive favors because Denmark was 
basically defenseless and because Britain did not have the means to 
prevent a German occupation. These deficiencies, however, were made 
good by skillful and far-sighted economic arrangements with the 
belligerents and by an equally skillful diplomacy. Domestic consensus in 
matters of foreign policy also played a role and helped pursue a foreign 
policy which successfully projected the image and content of impartial 
neutrality. 44 
The Nether lands, more than any other country in the First World War, 
was caught between "the anvil of Germany and the hammer of Great 
Britain". 45 Like Denmark, its policy of neutrality tended to be pro-German 
in military and strategic matters. Due to the very large transit trade in 
building materials and an enormous export of sand and gravel to the 
German front in Belgium and Northern France, the Netherlands came to 
be regarded as a "military highway" for Germany. 46 Due to German 
pressure, it was the only European neutral which in 1917/18 preferred to 
be embargoed until the end of the war instead of signing an agreement 
with the allies.47 While it was subservient to Germany's strategic interests, 
it had considerable influence on Germany in terms of trade, business 
relations, and the economy. In contrast to the Scandinavian neutrals, the 
Netherlands were an economic global player with a rich colonial empire, 
foreign investment surpassed only by that of Great Britain, France, and 
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Germany, and valuable business connections on a large scale with the 
US." Particularly during the second half of the war, this role influenced 
German decision-making and provided the Dutch with some freedom of 
action. 
Sweden was the only northern neutral with true foreign policy options. 
Her population was less than that of the Netherlands (5 million in 1900 as 
compared to some 6 million Dutch), but much more than those of Nor-
way or Denmark. Her economy was the most diversified of the three 
Scandinavian countries, and the army was larger and better equipped. Her 
political and diplomatic relations with Germany were good, that is, Germa-
ny's means to exert pressure on Sweden were limited, while the Swedish 
iron ores were indispensible for the German war effort. And until early 
1917 she held a powerful weapon: the allied transit trade to Russia.49 In 
economic terms, Sweden's policy of neutrality clearly favored Germany. 
This favorable attitude also translated into matters of policy, for example 
the extensive intelligence cooperation througout the war (telegrams, 
deciphering etc.). Although the domestic scene was perhaps characterized 
by less consensus, its self-perception as a European power of some 
standing may have helped to define national interests more clearly than 
was the case in Norway and Denmark. Sweden was the least vulnerable 
of the four countries during the war, and it was able to conduct a rela-
tively independent foreign policy. so 
The different capabilities and potentials of the northern neutrals were 
reflected in their approach towards the British blockade and towards trade 
relations with Germany. The blockade, envisaged in outlines in the pre-war 
period, developed into a tight system of economic control encompassing 
large parts of the globe. It was targeted at crippling German external trade 
and finance, and it included all of the neutral countries to varying degrees. 
Roughly speaking, the blockade developed along the following lines: 
I) Between the outbreak of war and July 1915, neutral and belligerent 
rights codified by international law were comprehensively repudiated. 
Practically all products were classified as contraband and became subject 
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to seizure, if the owner of the goods could not prove convincingly that the 
goods were not destined for Germany or for home consumption in neutral 
countries. During that time, the British government negotiated with the 
neutrals in order to stop trans-shipments to Germany. By March 1915, all 
German transatlantic trade had come to an end, and British policymakers 
realized more clearly than ever that foodstuffs or the lack of them consti-
tuted Germany"s "Achilles heel", as Maurice Hankey argued." The block-
ade would not have been possible without the tacit acquiescence of the 
American government. But it would also have been impossible if the 
German navy had been able to open transatlantic channels." 
2) Between July 1915 and April 1917, blockade managers tried to ration 
the neutral countries according to their pre-war needs, and they negotiated 
treaties to reduce the export of home-produced goods from neutral 
countries to Germany. Also, financial transactions among the neutrals 
came to be increasingly supervised. 
3) The American entry into the war greatly enhanced the possibilities of 
economic warfare. The US put considerable pressure on the neutrals to 
stop trading with the enemy. By fully or partially embargoing the neutrals, 
Washington largely succeeded in putting a stop to neutral-German trade. 
After the armistice, the blockade was strengthened further - all Swedish-
German trade via the Baltic came under control as well-, before the Allies, 
and in particular the Americans, called for its speedy abolition. 
The blockade was a major reason for Germany's defeat. However, it was 
not solely responsible for the increasing economic problems within 
Germany. The supervision and allocation of raw materials, for example, 
was superbly organized, and in view of manpower shortages it is difficult 
to imagine that Germany could have produced more weapons or machin-
ery. Foodstuffs were a much more complex problem, and here the Ger-
man authorities failed utterly. Thus, home-made organizational and institu-
tional difficulties are as responsible for the lack of foodstuffs within 
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Gennany as the so-called "hunger blockade"." 
Let us now turn to the approaches of the neutral countries towards the 
blockade. I have divided this part in two; I will first discuss the specific 
blockade arrangements, and then I will comment on national peculiarities. 
The test case of British capabilities to influence the trade of the neutrals 
became the Netherlands, and the Netherlands Overseas Trust (NOT) 
became the model for all other bodies and institutional arrangements in 
neutral countries. Early in the war, the Netherlands government declined to 
conclude official agreements with the British because it was subject to 
heavy pressure from Gennany, and it felt that the government would be 
open to criticism of not being neutral. Instead, British authorities on the 
spot, the government, and a community of businessmen and bankers 
devised the NOT. This private organization guaranteed the home-con-
sumption of goods entering the Netherlands. All other goods not consigned 
to the NOT (or, in a few cases, to the government) were suspect and 
liable to seizure." With respect to home-produced goods, things were 
more complicated; while the NOT agreed to supervise the export of Dutch 
products made from imported raw materials or semi-finished goods, it 
declined to deal with agricultural exports. In mid-1916, an agreement 
between the blockade ministry and a bureau representing the Dutch 
agricultural coooperatives was concluded. However, severe pressure and a 
second agreement of November 1916 were necessary before the flow of 
foodstuffs to Gennany declined significantly." On the model of the NOT, 
the Swiss in the fall of 1915 set up the Societe Surveillance Suisse (SSS), 
which operated like the NOT, but was organized and supervised by the 
government. 56 
In Denmark, government export prohibitions and controls were in 
operation from early on in the war. In November 1915, the British govern-
ment concluded agreements that guaranteed the home consumption of 
goods with the Industrierad (Council of Industry) and the Grosserer 
Societe! (Merchant's Guild). These organizations represented the bulk of 
Danish industrial companies. Infonnal agreements with the Danish agricul-
tural cooperatives ensured that foodstuffs for export were more or less 
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equally divided between the belligerents. However, in comparison with the 
pre-war period, more and more Danish foodstuffs reached the Gennan 
market." 
Norway constituted yet another example. Due to the relatively high 
degree of specialization and concentration on a few industries, branch 
agreements or treaties with individual companies were concluded. Also, 
the important Norwegian shipping lines consented to various agreements 
with the British. In 1916, the Norwegian government concluded an 
agreement that severely limited the export of fish ,and pyrites to Gennany. 
Neither could be honored- and in the winter of 1916/17, Norway was 
squeezed between the conflicting demands of the belligerents and sub-
jected to a British embargo on coal. In the course of the negotiations with 
Britain, Foreign Minister Ihlen had made the mistake of not,infonning the 
Gennans -a clear case of diplomatic mismanagement. 58 
As the only northern neutral, Sweden refused to discuss her export 
regulations with the British, and she also declined to provide them with 
statistics. There were agreements with shipping lines, but in general 
economic warfare was conducted on a piecemeal basis - that is, ships 
destined for Sweden were frequently held up or their cargoes were 
brought to the prize court. While exports of raw materials continued to 
flow to Gennany, foodstuffs did not enter the Gennan market on a grand 
scale. However, the absence of agreements caused considerable shortages 
and contributed to popular discontent with the government in 1917.59 
Following the American entry into the war, all of the northern neutrals 
sent delegations to the US in order to negotiate for raw materials and food 
stuffs. The British took a rather relaxed back seat, but became increas-
ingly disturbed by conflicting ideas and contradicting proposals of Ameri-
can government bureaucracies. In the course of 1918, London pressured 
the Americans to enter into agreements on shipping and rationing with 
Norway, Sweden and Denmark. The' three countries in turn promised to 
heavily decrease their export to Gennany. 60 Due to Gennan threats, the 
Dutch were unable to conclude a corresponding shipping and rationing 
agreement, and were subject11d to an American embargo until November 
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of 1918. 
This brief overview highlights major similarities and differences, and it 
is tempting to compare the approaches of the neutral countries. The 
differing approaches may have as much to do with the development of the 
war, the specific circumstances with which each country was faced as 
with the differing national cultures. Switzerland constitutes a very interest-
ing example, because it was the only country which concluded a compre-
hensive government-to-government agreement. The reasons are complex, 
but two factors seem quite apparent: 
I) Land-locked Switzerland was completely dependent on foreign trade 
and raw materials for her industry. Swiss industrial exports were more or 
less evenly divided among the belligerents, and in order to prevent a 
serious domestic crisis, the Allies accepted certain exports to Germany. 
2) Switzerland had a larger military potential than the other neutrals and 
could therefore negotiate from a position of relative strength. It did not 
have to fear Allied or German military threats. Because German potential to 
pressure the Swiss was very ·limited, the government was capable of 
dealing with economic warfare on an official basis." 
In contrast, the Netherlands were subject to severe German and British 
pressure. What facilitated the foundation of the NOT was the specific 
character of Dutch trade. The former East India Company, renamed 
Nederlandse Handel Maatschappij, still exerted considerable infl!Jence 
among the business community. The rather small group of leading busi-
nessmen, entrepreneurs, and bankers knew each other well. They realized 
that their foreign investments, the colonial trade, and their overseas 
transportation were in danger. On the other hand, they looked to the 
future, and they were well aware that the economic development of the 
Netherlands was closely connected to that of Germany. Therefore, the 
same group of people who made blockade deals with the British were 
forging new business alliances with their German counterparts. On the 
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whole, Germany consented to the NOT, particularly during the second 
half of the war, because the government and the business community 
realized that they needed the Dutch in the post-war period. Thus, with 
respect to the government-business relations and the coherence of the 
business community itself, one can speak of a relatively well"developed 
corporatist model. What is equally important is the fact that as a corrolary 
to the NOT, the Dutch government did not place restrictions on the export 
of home-produced foodstuffs. Moreover, farmers' cooperatives had a 
lesser degree of coherence than in Denmark. This made it difficult for the 
British to find negotiating partners, and when they did find them, they 
proved themselves to be unreliable at first. What appears from all this is a 
bifurcation of the Dutch economy: merchants and industrialists were 
temporarily forced to comply with the British, while banking and the 
extensive agricultural sector cooperated with Germany. 62 
In the case of Denmark, the cooperatives had a traditionally high 
degree of influence among their members. In the first year of the war, 
therefore, they were able to supervise exports to a comparatively high 
degree. Due to long-term calculations, the cooperatives did not want to 
lose their main market, Britain. The respective British authorities were well 
aware of this, and they therefore consented to oral agreements and little 
government interference. 1916 saw a significant decline in exports to 
Britain and a rise in exports to Germany, mainly because of the enormous 
price differences. In 1917, however, the blockade and the American 
·embargo assured a significant decrease of this trade. Industrial products 
did not play a significant role.63 
Norway demands yet other interpretations. Branch agreements fulfilled 
the purpose, because of the economic concentration on a few sectors. 
The relatively high degree of official governmental involvement can be 
explained by the fact that fish and pyrites constituted two very important 
segments of the economy. 64 The lack of timely communication with 
German officials may have had something to do with the fact that the 
Norwegian government perceived Germany to be very far away. And it 
may also have had something to do with the deep resentment caused by 
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the submarine warfare. 
In connection with the strategic position of Sweden, I have already 
mentioned a number of aspects which explain the opposition to any 
agreements with the Allies. The main export product, iron ore, was heavily 
dependent on the German market, and Swedish industrialists, like their 
counterparts in the Netherlands, looked to a promising market in the. 
future. Moreover, there was a considerable network of personal, business 
and financial ties with industrialists in the Ruhr valley, which in turn 
influenced governmental policies. A case in point is the Enskilda Bank, 
owned by the Wallenberg family, which served as a leading neutral credi-
tor to German companies during the war.65 Although exports of foodstuffs 
were not negligeable, they did not play such as important a role as in 
Denmark or the Netherlands. 
In conclusion, r d like to reiterate a few points: 
I) Neutrality rested less on the sovereign decision of the neutral countries 
to remain neutral. Apart from Sweden (and Switzerland) neutrality was 
guaranteed because the belligerents felt this to be in their strategic and 
economic interest. 
2) The blockade impacted greatly on Germany and the neutral countries. 
However, untill916, the neutrals proved to be an invaluable source of raw 
materials and foodstuffs. Leading German politicians declared at various 
times in 1916 that without neutral imports, Germany would have col-
lapsed. 
3) Thus, it was mainly due to the American entrance into the war and the 
. ' 
embiirgoes against the neutrals that the blockade became truly successful. 
4) In the case of the Netherlands and Denmark, the war spurred import 
substitution and industrialization, thus laying the foundations of the mod-
ern economies (see tables 4 and 5). 
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Selected Statistics on Economic Development, Trade and Finances 
Table 1: Dutch Trade with Germany and Great Brltlan, 1913·1920 (Mill. Goldmall<s) 
Imports from Exports to Exports to Great Imports from Great Britain 
Gennany Gennany Britain (and re-exports from British 
Empire) 
1913 693,65' 333,03' 482,62 419,22 
1~14 615,08' 451,60' 496,93' 435,33' 
1915 515,54' 1.290,1' 478,53' 621,68' 
1916 (1st halt) 334,92' 945,711b 451,94' 674,84' 
1917 415,74' 535,13c 406,95' 507,16' 
1918 542,49c 260,26c 157,46' 314,93' 
1919 731,77' 976,82c 443,76' 1.239,23' 
1920 1.526,07" 711,49' 803,7" 1.269,96' 
Sources: a) Statistik des Deotschen Reiches 1913-l. Halbjahr 1916. Letter of the Deotsche Handelsstelle im 
Haag to the director of the Kriegswirtscha:ftliche Abteilung im Reichsamt des Innem, Hans Karl Freiherr von 
Stein zu Nord· und Ostheim, 8 March 1917, in: BAB, Reichsamt des Jnnern, 18837, Bl. 474-480; b) Ausfuhr 
unfteicr Goter aus den Nieder1anden, Juli-Dezemher 1916, in: Algemeen Rijksan:hief, Den Haag, Dir H&N, 
1176; c) Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, S. 542; d) Mitchell and Dean, Abstract of British Historical 
Statistics, Overseas Trade, Nr. 12. C 









1913 1914 % 1915 % 1st half 1916 
1913 1914 % 1915 % 1st half1916 
change to change to 
I 
change to change to I 1913 1913 
1913 . 1913 Pork 1.559 1.990 +28 4.860 +312 1.690 
Cattle 5.649 84.466 + 1495 11.465 +203 33.884 Beef 1.074 1.723 + 60,5 25,147 + 2342 12.514 
Beef 9338 4.974 -53 13.864 +67 15.576 Butter 400 1.200 +300 8.125 +2021 6.387 
Pork 8.907 6.075 -32 42.207 +473 21.336 
18.455 18.468 0 29.685 + 61 9.957 
Herring (barrels) 11.443 89.505 + 782,2 130.102 + 1137 114.209 
Butter 
Cheese 16.923 20.954 + 23 50.728 +299 38324 
Fresh Fish 30.071 36.705 +22 38.136 +27 24.171 
Eggs 8.433 8361 - I 21.719 +257 17.225 
Herring (barrels) 705.133 811.013 + 15 933.464 +32 173.382 
Norway 
1913 1914 % 1915 % lsthalf.l916 
Denmark change to change to 
1913 1914 % 1915 % 1st half1916 
1913 1913 
change to change to Train oil 31.317 33.057 + 5,5 43.439 1913 1913 + 38,7 11.503 
Cattle 157.000 193.363 +23 265.000 +68 196.609 Herring 235.560 496.233 + 210,6 1.489.485 +632 1.024.426 
Beef 12.497 16.852 + 34,8 18.953 +52 14.237 
(barrels) 
Pork 5.249 6.466 +23 38.523 + 733 11.425 
Fresh Fish 40.904 39.482 -3 46.269 + 13 26.342 
Butter 2.155 . 3.861 + 79 25.160 + 1167 14.934 Dried Fish 2.453 2158 -8 14.356 + 585 12.793 
Cheese 71,0 291 +410 3.270 +4605 1.617 
Eggs 1.235 1.320 + 6,8 13.069 + 1058 12.690 Sources: Appendi_x, Speech of State Secretary Karl Helfferich in the budget commission of the Reichstag, 30 
Fresh Fish 28.907 26.950 -7 51.165 +77 47.049 September 1916, m: PA, AA, R 21474; undated memorandwn, Auswartiges Am~ in: ibid., R 21473. 
. 
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Table3 
Development ol Gross National Income in the Netherlands 1914-1919IMIII. Guilders) 
1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 
Nominal 2346 2761 3102 3202 3510 4793 
Real 2278 2443 2697 2336 2006 2471 
Change in% to 1914 {!llll) -- +7,2 +15,5 +2,5 -12 +8,4 
Source: l.J. Brugmans, Paardenkracht en Menschemnacht. Sociaa~Economische Geschiedenis van Nederland 
1795-1940, 's-Gravenhage 1961,454, and own computing. Not included are foreign investments, loans to 
foreign companies and countries, etc. 
Table4 
Increase In Capitalization of Dutch Companies in Selected Branches, 
1 October 1915 • 1 October 1918(Gullders) 










Source: Commercial Attache Car! Gneist to Auswartiges Am~ 19 October 1918, and Algerneen Handelsblad, 
14 October 1918, in: BAB, Auswartiges Am~ Handelspolitische Abteilung, 3984, pp. 147-151. 





Foreign Trade ol the Nordic countries by commodity groups 1%1 
Denmark 
1900-04 1910-14 1921-5 1936-9 
Agricultural products 89.0 87.0 81.0 72.0 
Industrial products 5.0 8.0 16.0 23.0 
Other goods 6.0 5.0 3.0 5.0 
Norway 
1895 1905 1925 1935 
Fishing & whaling prnducts 17.4 15.6 13.8 9.9 
Timber, pulp & paper prnducts 20.4 21.9 23.6 13.8 
Mining, metals & chemicals 2.4 3.4 12.8 17.2 
Other industrial products 11.0 9.7 13.5 10.6 
Shipping services 38.9 32.5 29.0 38.2 
Other products 9.9 16.9 7.3 10.3 
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Increase of gold in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, 1914·1919 ffi 00 
~ 
Netherlands (Guilders) Switzerland (Franks) Sweden (Crowns) 
"" CD
Mio. Increase in Mio. Increase in Mio. 






31.12.1914 473,1 54,5 455,9 59,8 304,1 
21.12.1915 577,1 88,5 465,6 63,2 327,9 
30.12.1916 758,4 147,7 536,5 88,0 417,5 
31.12.1917 890,3 190,8 702,3 146,2 572,7 
31.12.1918 1068,9 249,1 975,7 242,0 813,5 
31.12.1919 1032,7 237,3 1036,1 263,2 747,6 
Source: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., Economische Berichten No. 8 (1920), 319. 
Increase in % 
to 1914 
27,2 
37,2 
74,7 
139,6 
240,4 
212,8 
r ~ 
" 
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